We present an algebra that is intended to bridge the gap between programming formalisms that have a high level of abstraction and the operational interpretations these formalisms have been designed to capture. In order to prove a high-level formalism sound for its intended operational interpretation, one needs a mathematical handle on the latter. To this end we design the computation calculus. As an expression mechanism, it is su ciently transparent to avoid begging the question. As an algebra, it is quite powerful and relatively simple.
Introduction
For reasoning about (imperative style) programs, lots of extensions of predicate calculus or logic are in circulation: Hoare-logic, wp-calculus, temporal logics of various kinds, UNITY-logic, etc. All these extensions enrich the language of predicate calculus with 'primitives' intended to capture some operational aspects of programs, e.g. in wp-calculus:
wp.s.q: holds in those initial states for which every execution of program s terminates in a state satisfying the predicate q, in linear time temporal logic:
Gs: holds for those computations (i.e inÿnite sequences of states) for which every su x satisÿes s, and for a UNITY program:
wlt.q: holds in those (initial) states for which every computation of the program contains at least one state satisfying the predicate q. The verbal right-hand sides above are 'intended operational interpretation' without any formal status: they serve only to translate operational intentions into the formalism. In order to actually prove properties of programs, the formalisms supply rules in the form of postulates, deÿnitions, axioms, inference rules, and so forth. Here is a random sample from each of the aforementioned formalisms: This is where the problems start. Although for many of the rules it is quite clear that they are indeed adequate for the intended operational interpretation -see (a) -this is by no means always the case -see (c). This distance between intended interpretation and mathematical formalization is what we call "the formalization gap". If large, the formalization gap can become a serious problem, since it means that the math we write down does not necessarily mean what we think it does.
In this paper we develop an algebra, called "the computation calculus", that is intended to bridge this formalization gap. The idea is that intended operational interpretations can be expressed succinctly in the computation calculus and characterizations on a higher level of abstraction can subsequently be derived from that, e.g. for the predicate transformer wlt, we would ideally like to be able to derive the ÿxpoint expression in (c) from some 'direct' formalization of the intended operational interpretation.
We abstract the computation calculus from a simple model of computations. Thus, we start with a model wherein we deÿne some operators satisfying certain properties. Subsequently, we forget the deÿnitions and postulate the relevant properties. This ensures that all results in our algebra are at least applicable to the model we abstract it from.
Although the computation calculus is potentially more general than the instance we abstract it from, greater generality is not the purpose of the exercise. The reason for the abstraction is twofold. Firstly, life is simpler at the higher level of abstraction, the landscape less cluttered with detail. Therefore, there is less chance of getting lost or tripping up. Secondly, since results in the algebra are derived from the postulates only, their validity in the model relies only on the postulates being satisÿed therein. Thus, the abstraction provides a clear view on the properties we actually use and, hence, the assumptions we rely on.
The procedure we follow is incremental for both the model and the algebra. We begin with a model that is far too general and we extract from this some very elementary insights that we capture in our postulates. As we become more ambitious in the things we want to prove, we may ÿnd that our algebra is still not strong enough. We then add what is missing to the algebra and impose, if necessary, the appropriate restrictions on the model.
After the initial exploration of the basics, the ÿrst slightly more ambitious target we aim for is the pre-=postcondition semantics of simple sequential programs. The biggest hurdle to overcome here is the treatment of (tail-) recursion. Subsequently, we prepare the ground for higher targets by enriching our algebra with some insights concerning atomic computations. This leaves us with an algebra that is very powerful indeed: subsuming various temporal logics. Finally, we demonstrate the algebra in action by applying all of it to a non-trivial problem: the derivation the ÿxpoint characterization of wlt -see (c) -from its intended operational interpretation.
We build on the predicate calculus of Dijkstra and Scholten [3] augmented with whatever facts from lattice theory we have use for, in particular the ÿxpoint calculus as explored by Backhouse et al. [13] . Some highlights of this calculus are listed in the appendix.
Readers familiar with relation algebra in any form, the sequential calculus of von Karger and Hoare [9] , or any of various temporal logics may recognize where we got our inspiration from. However, unfamiliarity with these ÿelds should not stand in the way of understanding our algebra.
Basics of the model
Our model is in essence taken from Johan Lukkien's Ph.D. Thesis [11] . A "program (fragment)" or "statement" operates on a set of states. Starting a statement in some initial state results in a sequence of (atomic) steps each of which ends in a new state. We call the sequence of states traversed during the execution the computation generated by the statement. Computations can be ÿnite or inÿnite but not empty (0 steps means that the initial state is also the ÿnal state, i.e. generates a singleton computation). So we have:
S: the state space; a nonempty set, the elements of which we call 'states'. C: the computation space; a set of nonempty, ÿnite or inÿnite sequences of states that we call 'computations'. A speciÿcation is a predicate on computations, i.e. a function of the type C → B. We also consider programs to be speciÿcations: they specify exactly those computations their execution may result in. Thus, both speciÿcations and statements are elements of the set CPred, deÿned as:
This provides a standard model for the predicate calculus as developed in [3] where all boolean operators are lifted: (s ⇒ t): ≡ (s: ⇒ t: ); ∀i :: s:i : ≡ ∀i :: s:i: , etc., and 'everywhere' quantiÿes over all computations: [s] ≡ ∀ :: s: .
We extend the predicate algebra with sequential composition. Using #; ↑, and ↓ to denote the list operations 'length', 'take', and 'drop' respectively, we deÿne: Deÿnition 1. For all predicates s and t and computations
Note the 'one point overlap' between ↑ n + 1 and ↓ n, which re ects that the ÿnal state of the s-subcomputation is the initial state of the t-subcomputation.
In order for the right-hand side of (1) to be well typed, the sequences ↑ n + 1 and ↓ n must be computations for all n in the range. We therefore impose on C the restriction that it satisÿes: Requirement 2. Nonempty segments of computations are computations.
Sequential composition is universally disjunctive in its ÿrst argument, positively disjunctive in its second argument, and associative. Moreover, it has the (left-and right-) neutral element 5 given by:
Not distinguishing between a singleton computation and the single state it consists of, the singleton computations are a subset of S. We assume that S does not contain states that do not partake in any computation:
This means that 5 is the characteristic predicate of our state space and that we can identify predicates on the state space with predicates that hold only for singleton 'computations'.
Basics of the algebra
The computation calculus is an algebra on objects of the type CPred and it is an extension of the predicate calculus, i.e: Postulate 5. CPred is a predicate algebra.
Postulate 5 means that we import all the postulates for the predicate calculus from [3] . These postulates characterize exactly a complete boolean lattice with the order [ ⇒ ] and the boolean operators denoting the various lattice operations.
The ÿrst extensions we introduce are a further binary operator and an extra constant:
; : CPred 2 → CPred and 5 : CPred:
Composition (;) binds more strongly than the binary boolean operators but -as all binary operators -more weakly than unary operators. The additional ingredients satisfy:
(i) ; is universally disjunctive in its ÿrst and positively disjunctive in its second argument. (ii) ; is associative and 5 is its neutral element.
These postulates amount to little more than that our calculus is what Roland Backhouse calls a "semi-regular (boolean) algebra". This is a very general structure and so there would appear to be little of consequence to be deducible from these postulates alone. For the moment, however, they are all we have got. Some standard consequences that we do not care to list as separate results are that composition is monotonic in both arguments and has false as a left-zero element.
Life becomes more interesting with the introduction of some vocabulary:
As noted in the previous section, these correspond to predicates on our state space. For state predicates we record the highly useful.
Fact 8 (State-restriction rules). (i) p ; s = p ; true ∧ s; and (ii) s ; p = s ∧ true ; p for all s; and all state predicates p.
Proof. We show only the ÿrst. On account of monotonicity it su ces to prove '⇐' and this follows after shunting from the observation that
The state-restriction rules express that by pre-=postÿxing a state predicate p to a predicate s, we obtain a characterization of those s computations for which the initial=ÿnal state satisÿes p. We proceed by exploring the consequences of requiring the ÿnal state to satisfy false, i.e. be nonexistent. Instantiating state restriction rule (Fact 8(ii)) with p := false yields s ; false = s ∧ true ; false:
Interpreting true ; false in the model, we ÿnd that this predicate holds exactly for the inÿnite ("eternal") computations. We introduce names for this constant and for its negation (which of course characterizes the finite computations) and we introduce some more vocabulary.
Deÿnition 9.
E; F : CPred; E = true ; false and F = ¬E:
Thus, the preceding observation now reads: Fact 10. s ; false = s ∧ E for all s.
We now explore to what extent our modest postulates allow us to conÿrm our expectations concerning ÿnite and inÿnite behaviour. The ÿrst things to note are that, on account of Fact 10 and elementary predicate calculus, we have for all s
Composition being universally disjunctive in its ÿrst argument, false is left-zero thereof. Consequently, it follows from (a) that the eternal predicates are precisely the left-zeroes of composition:
Fact 11 (Preemption theorem).
[s ⇒ E] ≡ ∀t :: s ; t = s for all s:
Since composition is positively disjunctive in its second argument and s ; false = false means that s ; distributes over existential quantiÿcations with an empty range as well, we get from (b) the useful:
We conclude this section with a couple of exercises. In spite of the heading "Etude" we freely use the following facts as theorems.
Etude 13. Leaving universal quantiÿcation over the free variables understood:
3. Hoare-triples and 'Leads-to'
Let s be some statement; let p and q be state predicates. The Hoare-triple {p} s {q} asserts that every s-computation for which the initial state satisÿes p terminates in a ÿnal state satisfying q. The s-computations with an initial state satisfying p are given by p ; s and the computations that terminate in a state satisfying q are given by F ; q. Thus, the Hoare-triple can be translated into our algebra as:
Now, let u be some UNITY program. In UNITY -where the program under consideration is left implicit -the assertion p → q expresses that every u-computation for which the initial state satisÿes p has some state satisfying q. Since the computations that have a state satisfying q are those that satisfy F ; q ; true, this can be rendered in our algebra as
Considered as equations in the unknown p of the type 'state predicate', the weakest solution of (a) is wp:s:q and the weakest solution of (b) is wlt:q: So we would like to get some grip on these weakest solutions.
State predicates and computation quantiÿers
We denote some special attention to the universe of state predicates. The ÿrst thing to do is to name this universe:
One immediate consequence of this deÿnition is that (SPred; [ ⇒ ] ) is also a complete boolean lattice. From the encompassing lattice, it inherits all the lattice operations that it is closed under, i.e. existential quantiÿcation, disjunction, and conjunction. The other lattice operations on SPred -we use only negation and universal quantiÿcation -are easily deÿned in terms of the corresponding ones on CPred: With these operators (and 5 playing the rôle of true) SPred is yet another predicate algebra.
For a state predicate p, the computations with an initial state satisfying p are characterized by p ; true. For the restriction of ; true to state predicates we introduce special notation, the 'initially operator': Deÿnition 16. · : SPred → CPred; ·p = p ; true:
'Initially' enjoys some properties not enjoyed by ; true in general. In particular:
Fact 17. ·∼p = ¬ ·p for all p:
Proof. By ping-pong argument.
true:
Combining the fact that the initially operator inherits universal disjunctivity from ; true with Fact 17, we now ÿnd that it is universally conjective as well. Consequently, the initially operator has both an upper adjoint and a lower adjoint. We introduce operators denoting these adjoints:
for all s and all state predicates p:
These operators are, in essence, the "trace quantiÿers" from the branching-time temporal logic CTL * [7] . Their interpretation is elementary:
• A's holds in those initial states for which every computation satisÿes s and • E's holds in those initial states for which at least one computation satisÿes s.
We call these operators the universal and existential computation quantiÿer, respectively. Using the universal computation quantiÿer, we can now lay our hands on the weakest solution of the Hoare-triple equation (a) from the previous section:
Since A(s ⇒ F ; q) is a state predicate, it is the weakest solution for p. As a succinct description of the intended operational interpretation of wp.s.q, we consider this a highly satisfactory solution: A(s ⇒ F ; q) expresses quite clearly that "every s-computation terminates in a state satisfying q", which is indeed what wp.s.q is supposed to mean.
The computation quantiÿers are not only in name and notation suggestive of quantiÿers, but also in their algebraic properties:
Etude 19. Leaving universal quantiÿcation over the free variables understood:
(i) "de Morgan": ∼ Es = A¬s.
(ii) A ∀i :: s i = ∀ s i ::
For the restriction of true ; to SPred, on might expect properties that are similar to those of the initially operator. However, since composition is only positively disjunctive in its second argument, "ÿnally" is slightly more complicated than "initially". Adapting (the mirror image of) the proof of (17) to cater for these complications, we obtain: Fact 20. true ; ∼p = ¬(F ; p) for all state predicates p:
Thus, as functions of the type SPred → CPred, the preÿxes true ; and F ; are each others dual. It follows that the one is as conjuctive as the other is disjunctive. Now, true ; is positively disjunctive while F ; is, on account of F being ÿnite, universally disjunctive; hence Fact 21. As functions of the type SPred → CPred (i) true ; is universally conjunctive; and (ii) F ; is positively conjunctive.
Weakest preconditions
In the precondition semantics of Dijkstra and Scholten [3] a statement s is characterized by two state-predicate transformers, wp.s and wlp.s. We introduce these functions into our algebra via their intended interpretation.
Deÿnition 22. For all s and state predicates q (i) wp:s:q = A(s ⇒ F ; q), and (ii) wlp:s:q = A(s ⇒ true ; q). Now that we have included the weakest preconditions in our algebra, we may seek to prove, as theorems in our algebra, facts that Dijkstra and Scholten postulate.
Since A is universally conjunctive (Etude 19(ii)), it follows from, respectively, Fact 21 and state-restriction rule (Fact 8(ii)) that:
Fact 23. For all s (i) wp:s is positively conjunctive and wlp:s is universally conjunctive.
(ii) wp:s:q = wp:s:5 ∧ wlp:s:q for all state predicates q.
Dijkstra and Scholten impose these as "healthiness conditions": properties that a pair (wp:s; wlp:s) should satisfy in order to qualify as a reasonable deÿnition of statement s. Since we can prove these properties from the intended interpretations (22), anything else would, indeed, be quite unhealthy.
From the universal conjunctivity of A and predicate calculus, we also get: These equalities are what Hesselink [8] uses to deÿne "nondeterministic choice". A moment of re ection should su ce to see that, in our model, nondeterministic choice is, indeed, captured by existential quantiÿcation.
Further exploration of the preconditions is greatly simpliÿed by the following two observations:
Fact 25. wlp:s = wp:(s ∧ F) for all s:
Fact 26 (wp-dualization). ∼ wp:s:q = E(s ; ∼ q) for all s and state predicates q:
The ÿrst of these follows immediately from the deÿnitions and the fact that, according to Etude 13(ii), true ; q = E ∨ F ; q. The second is established using state restriction and dualities (Etude 19(i) and Fact 20).
Our next natural target consists of the preconditions of sequential compositions. This is the point where we ÿnally reach the limit of our very modest initial postulates. Following [3] , we expect:
Fact 27 (Compositionality of the preconditions). (i) wp : (s; t):q = wp : s: (wp:t:q) and
(ii) wlp : (s ; t):q = wlp :s : (wlp :t:q) for all s; t and state predicates q.
Using Fact (25) and Etude 13(iii), we ÿnd the second of these to be equal to the ÿrst instantiated with s; t := (s ∧F); (t ∧F), so we need to consider the ÿrst only. Attempting to verify Fact 27(i) we observe -with the types of the dummies understood -that ∀s; t; q :: wp : (s; t):q = wp : s : (wp:t:q) = { negating both sides and (26) (thrice) } ∀s; t; q :: E(s ; t ; ∼q) = E(s ; E(t ; ∼q)) = { mutual instantiation: q := ∼ 5 and t := t ; ∼q; respectively } ∀s; t :: E(s ; t) = E(s ; Et) and here we get stuck. The last line is not provable because, as we will see, it need not -yet -be true in our model.
We make the compositionality of the preconditions a theorem of our algebra by adding the last line in the preceding calculation to our postulates.
Postulate 28 (Composition rule). E(s ; t) = E(s ; Et) for all s and t.
In the next section we check what this postulate means for our model, thereby establishing both that it is reasonable and that it is independent of the previous postulates. However, we gave the composition rule in its simplest, rather than in its weakest form. In order to facilitate the analysis of the next section, we request that the reader verify that Postulate 28 follows from the evidently weaker:
This is the rule that we now have a closer look at in our model.
Composition in the model
In our model of computations, the meaning of the existential computation quantiÿer is that, for any predicate s and any state :
(Es): = ∃ : = :0 : s: :
In order to keep the analysis of the composition rule in our model palatable, we introduce two abbreviations:
./ ≡ # ¡∞ ∧ last: = :0 (where last : = :(# − 1)); · ≡ ∃n : n¡# : = ↑ n + 1 ∧ = ↓ n (" ÿts " and " consists of followed by "). Now, Fact 28 states that
for all ÿnite s; all t; and all states ;
and spelling out the antecedent and consequent in isolation yields -after a considerable amount of juggling: Is this reasonable? Can we prove it? Well, since ./ means that the ÿnal state of the ÿnite computation coincides with the initial state of the computation , it is easily seen that there is a (unique) sequence of states such that · : just "paste" and together with one point overlap. However, the dummy in ( * ) ranges over our computation space C rather than over arbitrary sequences of states; thus, ( * ) expresses that our computation space is closed under "pasting".
The current restrictions on our computation space do not allow us to conclude this. Hence, if we ÿnd it reasonable, we have to require it explicitly. We do ÿnd it reasonable and so we impose on C the further restriction:
Requirement 29. C is closed under "pasting", i.e.
./ ⇒ ∃ : ∈ C :
· for all and in C:
Iterators
So far, the expressive power of our algebra is rather limited. We increase the expressive power -considerably -by the introduction of two more unary operators, * and ∞ , respectively. The operational interpretation of these operators is that s * corresponds to "s repeated any ÿnite number of times" and s ∞ corresponds -roughly -to "s repeated forever". We do not, however, try to formalize these operational intentions. Instead, we deÿne the operators by ÿxpoint expressions that have proven to be fundamental in similar algebraic contexts. Subsequently, we have a closer look at the operational signiÿcance of these operators in the current context. For a glossary on ÿxpoints, we refer the reader to the appendix.
We call these operators the "ÿnite iterator" and "inÿnite iterator", respectively, and they bind stronger than negation and the computation quantiÿers.
Arguably the single most important aspect of these operators is that they give us a handle on both extreme solutions of the 'tail-recursion equation' x = s ; x ∨ t.
Fact 31 (Tail-recursion theorem). For all s and t (i)
Proof. Along with a lot of other properties of 'Kleene-stars in general', a proof of (i) can be found in [13] . For the sake of completeness, we repeat it here. s * ; t = x :: s ; x ∨ t = { Deÿnition 30(i); dummy renaming } x :: s ; x ∨ 5 ; t = y :: s ; y ∨ t ⇐ { ; t is universally disjunctive; ÿxpoint fusion (see the appendix) } ∀x; y :
The proof of (ii) is similar: After these preliminaries, we now have a closer look at each of our iterators in isolation.
The ÿnite iterator
With exponentiation deÿned as usual: s 0 = 5 and s n+1 = s ; s n , the operational interpretation of s n is clearly "s repeated n times". Now, one readily veriÿes that Etude 32. s * = ∃n :: s n for all s and this substantiates the interpretation we gave for the ÿnite iterator, since the right-hand side expresses "s repeated any ÿnite number of times" almost literally.
In fact, Etude 32 is the more traditional deÿnition of a Kleene-star and all familiar algebraic properties of Kleene-stars are, indeed, enjoyed by ours. Since re-exploring these properties is not all that exciting, we refrain from doing so; we will just state the properties that we use when and where the need arises. For a ÿne treatment of general Kleene-stars based on ÿxpoint calculus we refer the reader to [13] .
We do take a closer look at the interaction between the ÿnite iterator and the constants F and E, since these are rather speciÿc for our algebra. For any s, we calculate:
The ÿrst of these disjuncts is eternal and, since F * = F (etude), the second disjunct is ÿnite. Thus, the eternal s * -computations are those that eventually get stuck in an eternal s-subcomputation and the ÿnite ones are those wherein every s-subcomputation is ÿnite. This is highly unsurprising but it is good to note that ÿnite iteration does not, in itself, introduce any 'new' nonterminating computations: if s is ÿnite, so is s * . For later reference we list two insights we just obtained:
The inÿnite iterator
Although the inÿnite iterator is less well known than the Kleene-star, we are equally brief about its algebraic properties. These properties are similar to those of the ÿnite iterator and, on the whole, unsurprising, e.g. the familiar "leap-frog" and "loop nesting" rules for Kleene-stars have obvious counterparts for the inÿnite iterator:
An exhaustive treatment of ∞ in relational calculus can be found in [5] . The operational interpretation of s ∞ is somewhat more subtle than that of s * . In order to get a tighter grip on the operational signiÿcance of the inÿnite iterator we begin with a taxonomy of s ∞ -computations. For any s, let s 1 = s ∧ 5; s f = s ∧ ¬5 ∧ F, and s e = s ∧ E, i.e. we partition the s-computations into singletons, ÿnite non-singletons, and eternal computations. Then 
of the computation consists of a single inÿnite s-execution. It is this type of s ∞ -computation that motivates reading ∞ as "forever" rather than "inÿnitely often" (though even "forever" is misleading in the presence of short circuits).
Short circuits s * f ; s 1 ; true: A ÿnite number of ÿnite s-computations ending with a singleton s-execution and followed by anything if at all. This term is not even eternal (unless equal to false) and so these computations may be rather unexpected for "s forever".
The thing to note is that singleton computations involve no computation steps and state predicates characterize just single states without any actual computation. Stretching the imagination, one can see state predicates as statements that "take no time". The equality s Alas, our current postulates do not allow us to conÿrm the latter fact. So far, all our postulates are also valid in relational calculus and in this context (Fact 35) is not true. So we add this to our postulates but ÿrst eliminate the inÿnite iterator:
= { Deÿnition 30(ii) and Knaster-Tarski (see the appendix) } 8. Tail-recursion, a.k.a. repetition
We now have a look at repetition or, slightly more generally, tail recursion. We consider recursive declarations that are, for some active s and some t, of the form ( * ) r = s ; r ∨ t;
i.e. r is a choice (∨) between a recursive case (s ; r) and a base case (t).
Although we generally feel that a recursive procedure declaration characterizes the procedure in question uniquely, the equality above actually fails to do so. The tailrecursion theorem (Fact 31) gives the two extreme candidates as s * ; t and s * ; t ∨ s ∞ , respectively, and the latter is in general properly weaker than the former. So we have to decide what solution of a recurrence equation we expect from a computing mechanism.
We claim that recursion operationally leads to weakest ÿxpoints, i.e. every computation that is not inconsistent with the equation should be considered possible. The case of tail-recursion presents corroborative evidence for this. Spelling out the weakest solution for r from ( * ) using the taxonomies from the previous section gives
This sums up the possibilities nicely: either the base case after a ÿnite number of unfoldings, an eternal s-computation after a ÿnite number of unfoldings, or inÿnite recursion.
Remark. The repetition r = while b do s od is characterized by its ÿrst unfolding:
The weakest solution for r from this is (b ; s) * ; ∼b ∨ (b ; s) ∞ , which one would also get straight from the operational understanding of the repetition.
The restriction to active s ensures that at least one atomic step separates the starts of any two incarnations of r. Operationally, this is inescapable, because the repetition involves at least one jump or subroutine call. So this requirement involves no signiÿcant loss of generality. Without it, some of the things below would come apart as a result of short-circuit loops.
The restriction to active s means that the recursion in ( * ) is "guarded". In our algebra, this does not imply that ( * ) has a unique solution, as it does in many process algebras. The price one pays for having unique solutions to guarded recurrence equations is the inability to distinguish between "unbounded" and "inÿnite".
Finally, note that nondeterminism has nothing to do with the ÿxpoint not being unique. The point is that the strongest ÿxpoint fails to capture the possibility of inÿnite unfolding.
Now, that we have the pieces together for dealing with tail recursion we take a look at the preconditions. Generalizing Dijkstra and Scholten's treatment of the repetition or applying Hesselink's theory of general recursion leads us to expect Fact 37. For all active s; all t; and all state predicates q (i) wp: x :: s ; x ∨ t :q = y :: wp:s:y ∧ wp:t:q and (ii) wlp: x :: s ; x ∨ t :q = y :: wlp: s:y ∧ wlp:t:q .
Let us see whether we can conÿrm this. The closed form of the tail-recursion theorem suggests that we look at the iterators in isolation ÿrst and we begin with the ÿnite iterator. For any s and state predicate q, we calculate: Using Facts 25 and 33(ii), the equality we just derived can be transformed into the corresponding one for the liberal precondition. So we have:
Fact 38. For all s and state predicates q: (i) wp:s * :q = y :: wp:s:y ∧ q and (ii) wlp:s * :q = y :: wlp:s:y ∧ q .
In essence, this takes care of Fact 37(ii). Using the closed form from the tailrecursion theorem and the rules for the liberal preconditions of disjunctions (Fact 24), compositions (Fact 27), and ÿnite iterations (above), we get wlp: x :: s ; x ∨ t :q = y :: wlp: s:y ∧ wlp:t:q ∧ wlp:s ∞ :q:
Since s is active, s ∞ is eternal by Fact 35 and hence (using Fact 25) wlp:s ∞ :q = 5. Consequently, the ÿnal conjunct above vanishes. Note that this ÿnal conjunct would not vanish, and indeed Fact 37(ii) would be false, if s were not active.
The equality of Fact 37(i) is less straightforward. Using the same recipe as above, we get for the left-hand side of Fact 37(i).
wp: x :: s ; x ∨ t :q = y :: wp: s:y ∧ wp:t:q ∧ wp:s ∞ :q;
whereas, using ÿxpoint fusion, we get for the right-hand side of Fact 37(i) y :: wp:s:y ∧ wp:t:q = y :: wp: s:y ∧ wp:t:q ∧ y :: wp: s:y :
Thus, we would be done if we can establish the equality of the two ÿnal conjuncts on the right (which amounts to our original proof obligation (Fact 37(i)) with t := false). Now, wp:s ∞ :q = y :: wp:s:y Sadly, this is not -yet -provable because it need not -yet -be true in our model. We did leave room in our model for the possibility of computations being eternal, but nothing in our current assumptions allows the conclusion that our computation space actually contains eternal computations. If all computations were ÿnite, the term in the last line above would almost always be false, but the same would not hold for the range.
The point is that the nonliberal precondition distinguishes itself from the liberal one also by guaranteeing termination. If certain eternal computations are a priori excluded from the range of possibilities, it may well be that a precondition that is weaker than the strongest ÿxpoint in Fact 37(i) would be su cient.
We do not believe in magical termination and we make our scepticism explicit by adding the ÿnal line of the preceding calculation as a postulate to our algebra.
Postulate 39 (Cycle rule). [p ⇒ E(s ; p)] ⇒ [p ⇒ Es
∞ ] for all p and s.
(This brings the total of our postulates up to Postulates 5, 6, 28, 36, and 39.)
Before we check what this means for our model, we record the ÿxpoint equality we had rewritten to obtain the cycle rule (see preceding calculation):
Fact 40. Es ∞ = y :: E(s ; y) for all s.
And now we have a look at the model. ) ] an scomputation that, if ÿnite, ends with a state that satisÿes p again. If existent, this ÿnal state is initial for another such s-computation which ÿts the previous one and, hence can be pasted to it. Repeating the process indeÿnitely or until an inÿnite s-computation is encountered, now yields our s ∞ -computation. Well, almost but not quite. Our 'computation-under-construction' converges to a sequence of states that would, indeed, be an s ∞ -computation if only it were a computation. But nothing in the current assumptions about C allows us to conclude the latter: C = S + would satisfy all restrictions well. We remedy the situation by imposing yet another restriction on our model. Requirement 41. C is "limit closed", i.e. every nonempty subset of C that is linear w.r.t the preÿx-order has an upper bound in C (upper bound w.r.t to the preÿx-order, naturally).
Cycles in the model
It should be noted that the limit closedness is stronger than necessary for ensuring the validity of the cycle rule. Putting it the other way around: the cycle rule is too weak to capture limit closedness in its full generality. We make do with the cycle rule because it is simple and it su ces for almost everything we want. Notable exceptions to the latter are general (mutual) recursion and UNITY programs with inÿnite assign sections.
Temporal logic and atomic steps
Having dealt to our satisfaction with the pre-=postcondition semantics of simple imperative programs, we now raise our sights. In pre-=postcondition semantics, the only things that interest us in a program are, for every initial state, the reachable ÿnal states and the possibility of nontermination. This is OK as long as these are the only things that matter.
There are, however, situations in which what happens in the course of program execution is also relevant or is all that is relevant. In particular, this is the case if programs are supposed to interact (with a user or with other programs). In such cases, we want to be able to specify run-time behaviour.
Various temporal logics have been designed precisely for this purpose. We have already mentioned the "branching time" temporal logic CTL * from Emerson and Srinivasan [7] , which is the logic from which we have borrowed our computation quantiÿers. CTL * is an extension of another logic: the "linear time" temporal logic LTL from Manna and Pnueli [12] . In fact, the trace quantiÿers that we borrowed are exactly what CTL * adds to LTL.
The language of LTL extends standard logic with a handful of temporal operators intended to be used to specify behaviour in time. The single most important of these is the unary "next-time operator" X: a computation satisÿes X s if the computation that follows the ÿrst atomic step satisÿes s.
There are two reasons why this is an operator of fundamental importance. Firstly, all the other temporal operators of LTL can be expressed in terms of it. Hence, X is all we need to obtain the full expressive power of LTL. Secondly and more importantly, this operator makes the grain of atomicity explicit and doing so is essential for reasoning about parallel programs with interleaving semantics.
So we add the next-operation to our algebra. There is, however, a slight di erence between LTL and our algebra. Where LTL is designed to be sound for models containing eternal computations only, the model from which we are abstracting our algebra contains ÿnite computations as well. In particular, our computation space contains atomic computations. Consequently, we can add "next" as a constant instead of an operator.
An atomic computation is a computation of length 2 and, after introducing the predicate X that holds for exactly these:
Deÿnition 42. X: ≡ # = 2, we can express the next-operation of LTL as Xs = X ; s.
To add X to the computation calculus, we need some algebraic characterization of it. The ÿrst thing we note is that X ; true holds exactly for the nonsingleton computations:
From this fact it can be inferred that singleton computations do not satisfy X and that atomic steps do. However, (a) also holds for X := ¬5 -it follows from (a) that this is so -thus, we still have to capture the fact that computations of length greater than 2 do not satisfy X. We do this by excluding that possibility of one computation having more than one preÿx satisfying X:
Seen as equation in the unknown X, (a) ∧ (b) has a unique solution in our model which is given by Deÿnition 42. But, models for our current postulates can be constructed wherein there are no solutions at all. Hence, we have to add this to our postulates. Right at the beginning, we required that our state space be contained in our computation space. This does not exclude the possibility of states that occur only in a singleton computation. In fact, a computation space consisting of nothing else but singleton computations satisÿes all the restrictions we imposed so far.
Since we consider this an undesirable degeneration of our model, we replace the no-junk property by the stronger requirement:
Requirement 43. An atomic step is possible for every initial state, which can be rendered algebraically as (c) EX = 5.
Atomicity and temporal logic
We extend our algebra with a new constant X of type CPred satisfying the following properties:
Postulate 44 (Atomicity rules).
We list some elementary consequences of these postulates:
Proof. That X is active and ÿnite -i.e. (i) -follows, respectively, from Postulate 44(i) and from Postulate 44(ii) with s := true. From (i), and Facts 35 and 33(i), we immediately obtain '⇒' for the two equalities in (ii) and the reverse implications are established by
The proofs of (iii) and its immediate consequence (iv) are left to the reader.
With the constant X, we have the full expressive power of LTL at our disposal (the full expressive power of CTL * in fact). The other temporal operators of LTL are "some-time", "always", and "until". Since we have no use for "until" we refrain from introducing it. The "some-time" operator is something we already have: it is the preÿx F ; . In order to be in accordance with the axiomatization of LTL, this operator should satisfy:
Fact 46. F ; s = x :: X ; x ∨ s for all s.
This fact follows immediately from Fact 45(ii) and the tail-recursion theorem (Fact 31(i) ). The most salient algebraic properties of "some time" are captured by: Fact 47. F ; is a universally disjunctive closure (see the appendix).
Which follows from Fact 12 and Etude 13(i).
We deÿne "always" as the dual of "some time":
On account of being the dual of a universally disjunctive closure:
Fact 49. G is a universally conjunctive interior (see the appendix).
The axiomatization of LTL for the always-operator boils down to the ÿxpoint characterization Gs = x :: X ; x ∧ s , but -since our computations may be ÿnite -this does not hold in our algebra. Instead, dualizing Fact 46 and simplifying the result with Fact 45(iii) yields:
If s is eternal; (X ; x ∨ 5) ∧ s = X ; x ∧ s since 5 is ÿnite. So; in that case; the above ÿxpoint characterization reduces to the one of LTL.
Taking care of the cosmetic di erences necessary to cater for the existence of ÿnite computations, the entire axiomatization of LTL can now be proved correct; so our algebra subsumes this logic completely. The reader may wonder how we fare with CTL * , but there is nothing to subsume here since CTL * has no axiomatization that we know of. Emerson and Srinivasan [7] do give an axiomatization for a (small) segment of CTL * and those axioms and inference rules are, indeed, all provable in our algebra (Postulate 44(iii) is essential here).
Persistence
The ÿxpoints of the interior operator G are of particular interest: they occur frequently and are pleasant to work with. We call these predicates 'persistent':
Since G is strengthening, the mathematical content of this equality consists of the implication [s ⇒ Gs].
If a computation has some persistent property, all of its su xes have the same property. This inheritance is something we frequently exploit and the following rule makes it algebraically explicit.
Fact 52 (Persistence rule).
[t ; u ∧ s ⇒ t ; (u ∧ s)] for all persistent s and all t and u:
Proof. This follows after shunting from the observation that:
Using the persistence rule in any particular circumstance requires that we establish the persistence of the particular instance of s involved. Obviously, a direct proof of [s ⇒ Gs] would do, but there are cheaper alternatives. The ÿrst and cheapest is induction on the syntax; from the idempotency, universal conjunctivity, and monotonicity of G respectively, it follows that Fact 53. For all s and functions t (i) Gs is persistent; and (ii) ∀i :: t:i is persistent ⇒ ∀i :: t:i and ∃i :: t:i are persistent.
The second cheap way for establishing persistence consists in weakening the proof obligation [s ⇒ Gs] using Fact 50 and ÿxpoint induction to [s ⇒ X; s ∨ 5]. In the -usual -case where s is active, the ÿnal ': : : ∨ 5' vanishes and this strategy boils down to Fact 54. s is persistent ⇐ [s ⇒ X ; s] for all s.
As an easy consequence of the persistence rule, we get a relation between the alwaysoperator G and the inÿnite iterator ∞ . For any s we have
from which we conclude -by ÿxpoint induction -that [G(s ; true) ⇒ s ∞ ]. Asking ourselves the question under which conditions the reverse implication -and hence equality -would hold, we ÿrst note that G(s ; true) = s ∞ implies that s ∞ is persistent. Thus the latter is a necessary condition for the reverse implication to hold. It is also su cient:
So we have found
Atomic actions
An atomic action is a statement generating only single-step computations:
Atomic actions satisfy a property that is similar to the state restriction rule (Fact 8(i) ) for state predicates.
Fact 57 (Atomic split). a ; s = a ; true ∧ X ; s for all atomic a and all s.
Proof. On account of monotonicity it su cies to prove '⇐' and this follows after shunting from the observation that: Since our algebra is by now quite powerful, one might expect the veriÿcation of the abide rule to be unproblematic. Sadly, it is not. Using the atomic split, one readily veriÿes that it su ces to prove the abide rule for s and t both equal to true, but then we get stuck.
The problem is that the validity of the abide rule in the model depends upon a property of the preÿx order 4 that our current postulates do not address:
for all computations and :
In [9] , something akin to this is called "local linearity".
This brings us to the ÿnal postulate of our algebra.
Postulate 59 (Linearity). For all s and t [s ; true ∧ t ; true ⇒ (s ; true ∧ t) ; true ∨ (s ∧ t ; true) ; true]:
We leave it to the reader to prove the abide rule from this. The growing number of postulates is making it increasingly di cult to ÿnd alternative models and we have not been able to construct a model that establishes that our ÿnal postulate does not follow from the rest. Still, we are reasonably conÿdent that it does not.
Unity
The need for formal support for operational reasoning was driven home to us in the course of our explorations of UNITY. State-predicate transformers for UNITY with a straightforward operational interpretation often have an intractable mathematical characterization, which makes the correctness of such a characterization nontrivial. As proof of the pudding, we apply all the machinery we have developed to progress in UNITY.
A small warning may be in order. Using the algebra does not make operational reasoning much less cumbersome than it otherwise would be, only much less error-prone. Spelling out the derivations below in meticulous detail would require a prohibitive number of pages. Therefore, the calculations are rather coarse grained, with many of the steps motivated by an 'etude'.
A UNITY program is given by a nonempty ÿnite set A of atomic actions. Execution of the program results in an inÿnite sequence of steps such that -each step consists of the execution of some action from A, and -every action in A is executed inÿnitely often.
Deÿning s by s = ∃a: a ∈ A : a , the computations described above are those that -consist of an inÿnite sequence of s-steps, and -contain, for every a ∈ A, an inÿnite number of a-steps.
From the deÿnition of s it follows that s is atomic and that [a ⇒ s] for all a ∈ A. These consequences are all we ever need and, therefore, all that we require in the formal characterization of UNITY computations. We give some equivalent characterizations; the reader may choose the one that he=she considers to be most convincing as the deÿnition.
Deÿnition and Fact 60. For any atomic s and nonempty ÿnite set A such that [a ⇒ s] for all a ∈ A, we deÿne -with the range a ∈ A understood -that (i) unity:s:A = G(s ; true) ∧ ∀a :: G(F ; a ; true) ;
Proof. The ÿrst two are direct translations into mathematics of the English description given above. The veriÿcation that these two are equal is reasonably straightforward: 
Now, let u = unity:s:A as deÿned by the ÿrst two. Then 
For the rest of this section we assume that s and A satisfy the premises of Deÿnition 60 and that u = unity:s:A:
In UNITY logic, as it was designed by Chandy and Misra [1] , progress of a unity program is captured by the relation → ("leads to") on state predicates. Operationally, p → q means that in any u-computation, every state satisfying p is succeeded eventually -possibly simultaneously -by some state satisfying q. Carefully transcribing this into our algebra yields F ; ·q) ] for all p and q.
For any q, we calculate the weakest p that leads to q:
= { u is persistent; i:e: "open" w:r:t: to the interior operator G }
So, we now get:
for all p and q; where the state-predicate transformer wlt is given by Deÿnition 63. wlt:q = A(u ⇒ F ;·q) for all state predicates q.
Spelling out the right-hand side in English, we get wlt:q : holds in those initial states for which every u-computation contains at least one state satisfying q, which is essentially what we wrote in the introduction. The formal deÿnition of the predicate transformer wlt given by Jutla et al. [10] is a double ÿxpoint expression which, in [6] , we showed to be equivalent to formula (c) of the introduction. Since the universal quantiÿcation in this formula corresponds to the weakest precondition of nondeterministic choice (Fact 24(i)) this characterization is the special case with s = ∃a :: a of the following:
Fact 64. wlt:q = x :: ∃a :: y :: q ∨ (wp:s:y ∧ wp:a:x) for all q:
The computation calculus has been designed to enable us to derive characterizations such as Fact 64 from deÿnitions such as Deÿnition 63. Characterization Fact 64 has two big advantages. Firstly, the dummies of the ÿx-point expressions are of the type state predicate rather than computation predicate. Secondly, the computation quantiÿers -hidden in wp-quantify over atomic steps only. Consequently, Fact 64 serves as a basis for progress considerations conducted solely in terms of state predicates and single computation steps.
Starting from Deÿnition 63, the objective is to push the computation quantiÿer as deep into the syntax tree as we can manage (all the way down to the atomic actions). We begin with dualization and elimination of q from our considerations: Thus, wlt.q is just the complement of the domain of another UNITY program Fact 65. wlt:q = ∼ E(unity:(∼ q ; s):{ a :: ∼ q ; a }).
Since our current UNITY program is completely general, we can do the instantiation with s; A := ∼ q ; s; { a :: ∼ q ; a } whenever we want and all that remains to be done is determining Eu. Now, according to Deÿnition 60(iii), u is the weakest solution of
and, from monotonicity of E and composition rule Fact 28 it follows that, for any solution x of ( * ), Ex is a solution of
Since u is the weakest solution of ( * ), it is not entirely unreasonable to expect, correspondingly, Eu to be the weakest solution of ( * * ). This leads us to conjecture:
Fact 66. Eu = x :: ∀ s a :: E(s * ; a ; x) .
We leave it to the reader to verify whether combining Facts 66 with 65 yields the ÿxpoint characterization Fact 64 of wlt.q; so proving Fact 66 is all that is left to be done.
Proof. The right-hand side is the weakest solution of ( * * ) and, since we just noted that Eu is a solution thereof, it su ces to show that [p ⇒ Eu] for any p solving ( * * ). To this end we ÿrst observe
The purpose of the last step is that, A being ÿnite, the last line above is amenable to induction over the cardinality of B.
Singleton B: Let B = {a} for some a ∈ A. Then
Non The predicate transformer wlt is not the only tool of the trade in UNITY theory. Two others state-predicate transformers capturing temporal properties are:
Deÿnition 67. For any state-predicate q (i) wst:q = A(u ⇒ G·q) and (ii) wta:q = A(u ⇒ F ; G·q).
The predicate transformer 'weakest stable' (wst) is characterized by Chandy and Sanders [2] via Fact 68. wst:q = y :: wp:s:y ∧ q for all q.
Upon trying to prove Fact 68 from Deÿnition 67(i), we found that we need to assume Eu = 5 for that. This follows from Ea = 5 for all a and, since totality of all the actions is a running assumption in UNITY, this is not a serious restriction; however, that it is essential for Fact 68 to be correct had hitherto escaped our notice entirely.
The predicate transformer 'weakest to-always' (wta) is introduced by Sanders and the present author in [4] via Fact 69. wta:q = x :: wlt:(wst:(x ∨ q)) .
There, a verbal argument is given for the correspondence with the operational interpretation Deÿnition 67(ii). This verbal argument can be rendered algebraically as a proof in the computation calculus.
Summary and concluding remarks
We developed the computation calculus as we went along and, consequently, the ingredients are scattered throughout the text. So let us summarize. The sum total of the postulates that make up the computation calculus is: the basic Postulates 5 and 6, the composition rule (Postulate 28), the accumulation rule (Postulate 36), the cycle rule (Postulate 39), the atomicity rules (Postulate 44), and linearity (Postulate 59). That is it. While, in general, we would like the algebras we use to be less complex, we feel that this is reasonably modest in view of what it achieves. We covered the precondition semantics for sequential programs of Dijkstra and Scholten. We have subsumed the linear time temporal logic of Manna and Pnueli. We have subsumed the language of CTL * and, while this "logic" has no proof system -that we know ofour algebra does give a handle on these expressions. Finally, the calculus as a whole is powerful enough for a mathematically explicit analysis of UNITY, something which no other formalism has enabled us to do. Also, scattered throughout the text are the restriction on our computation space ensuring that it provides a model for the computation calculus. We rendered these restrictions informally as:
Nonempty segments of computations are computations. C is closed under "pasting". C is limit closed. C contains an atomic step for every initial state. (Note that Requirement 4, i.e. that every state constitutes a singleton computation, is subsumed by the ÿrst and last of this list.) Putting the other way around, the computation calculus is 'sound' for the class of computation spaces satisfying these four 'healthiness properties'.
We consider these healthiness requirements to be quite reasonable and so we can live with the fact that the applicability of our algebra is restricted to computation spaces satisfying them. In fact, now that we have this list explicitly in front of us, we can see that the list constitutes assumptions that we used to make implicitly and without always being fully aware of it.
Although our algebra is quite powerful, there is some room to make it stronger still. Burghard von Karger noted that the composition rule (Postulate 28) and the linearity Postulate 59 can be replaced by a single postulate ("local linearity") that appears to be stronger than the conjunction of these two. Unfortunately, the formulation of this alternative requires the introduction of an operator from sequential calculus that we were careful to avoid since we felt that it did not go well with the objective of "expressive transparency". Moreover, we do not immediately see any use for the added formal strength.
A strengthening that would deÿnitely serve a purpose concerns the cycle rule. This rule fails to capture limit closedness in its full generality and, consequently, there are some signiÿcant problems that we cannot tackle. Unfortunately in this case, we have been unable to come up with a workable rule that captures limit closedness better.
Appendix A. On ÿxpoint calculus, closures and interiors
In our explorations of the computation calculus, we make heavy use of ÿxpoint calculus [13] . For a monotonic predicate transformer f we use x :: f: x to denote the strongest ÿxpoint and x :: f: x to denote the weakest ÿxpoint. We list the essential rules (for only).
Leaving universal quantiÿcation over the free variables and monotonicity of the functions understood, we have We also make some use of familiarity with 'closures' and 'interiors'. These are predicate transformers enjoying a cocktail of properties:
f is a closure ≡ f is monotonic; idempotent and weakening; f is an interior ≡ f is monotonic; idempotent and strengthening:
The most frequently exploited algebraic properties thereof are 
